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Chapter 4 
State UI Financing Response 
to the Great Recession
Wayne Vroman
The Urban Institute
The Great Recession of 2007–2009 placed a heavy strain on state 
unemployment insurance (UI) programs and their method of fi nanc-
ing. This short chapter introduces and discusses several aspects of 
the state UI responses during and after the downturn. Individual pro-
grams within the state UI system are highly varied. Whereas many 
states still have low net balances in their UI trust fund accounts at 
the Treasury, many other states have restored their trust funds to pre-
recession or even higher levels. This chapter documents the varied 
fi nancing responses of the state programs to the recession with spe-
cial attention to a number of specifi c elements in their responses. The 
chapter also assesses the health of the state trust funds as of mid-2016.
PROGRAM FINANCING RESPONSES
Two factors that contributed to the fi nancing diffi  culties experi-
enced by state UI programs during and after the Great Recession were 
the low level of reserves prior to the recession and the severity (both 
depth and duration) of the downturn. At the end of March 2011, the 
states had trust fund debts that exceeded $40 billion. At the end of 
June 2016, net reserves totaled roughly $36 billion. While the states 
still owed approximately $8 billion, this $76 billion turnaround was 
achieved by taking several distinct types of state-level actions.
Trust fund restoration was achieved both by actions that increased 
tax revenue and those that reduced UI benefi t payments. Table 4.1 
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summarizes six diff erent actions that states took aff ecting revenues. 
For each type of fi nancing response, the states are sorted according to 
their prerecession reserve ratio multiple (RRM, also termed the aver-
age high-cost multiple [AHCM]) measured at the end of 2007.1 The 
RRM is an index of trust fund adequacy that incorporates informa-

































Below 0.25 13 0 1 0 1 1 7
0.25–0.499 17 1 4 1 5 5 2
0.50–0.749 8 3 0 2 3 2 0
0.75–0.999 6 6 0 0 0 0 0
1.0–1.249 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
1.25 and 
above
4 2 0 0 2 0 0
Total 
number
51 15 5 3 11 8 9
Mean RRM 0.54 0.92 0.30 0.52 0.61 0.37 0.17
Median 
RRM
0.43 0.83 0.30 0.59 0.44 0.40 0.16
Table 4.1  State Actions to Improve UI Program Financing (Number of 
States), 2007 to 2016
a Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Maine, Maryland, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  
b Legislation to improve solvency in 2008 and 2009: Arkansas, New Hampshire, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. 
c Tax base indexation adopted after 2009: Colorado, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
d Tax base in 2015 at least 50 percent higher than in 2007: Delaware, Kansas, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Oklahoma (2013).  
e Municipal bonds issued during 2010–2013 to repay Treasury UI loans: Arizona, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
f FUTA tax credit off sets during 2012–2015 equal to at least 10% of total tax revenue: 
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, North 
Carolina, and Ohio. 
SOURCE: Table developed by the author with data from the Offi  ce of Unemployment 
Insurance, U.S. Department of Labor. 
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the size of a state’s economy. The latter is approximated by the total 
payroll of employers covered by the UI program in each state. Higher 
RRM levels signal more adequate trust fund balances. An RRM equal 
to 1.0 means there are 12 months of benefi ts in the trust fund, and 
many view an RRM of 1.0 as signaling an adequate UI trust fund 
balance.
Column (1) in Table 4.1 summarizes the distribution of RRMs 
for the 51 UI programs2 at the end of 2007 or just prior to the Great 
Recession. The mean and median RRMs for the 51 programs of 0.54 
and 0.43 indicate that the average prerecession trust fund balances 
were about half of the balances needed to meet the suggested actuarial 
standard of 1.0. Only seven states had an RRM of 1.0 or higher and 
30 had RRMs below 0.50, so many states entered the Great Recession 
with low trust fund reserve balances. 
Columns (2) to (7) identify the number of states undertaking 
specifi c revenue-enhancing actions. The identifi cation of specifi c 
actions in individual states is somewhat arbitrary, refl ecting my own 
judgments. The 15 states in column (2) allowed their UI tax laws to 
operate as written in their tax statutes. These states moved to higher 
tax rate schedules and made other adjustments automatically without 
legislative changes. Note that these states had trust funds with mean 
and median RRMs of 0.92 and 0.83, respectively, much larger than 
the group as a whole. This group also included 11 of the 13 states 
with a prerecession RRM of 0.75 or higher. Having large trust funds 
meant that these states had limited need for loans from the Treasury, 
and only two (Alabama and Maryland) borrowed from the Treasury 
from 2009 to 2012. 
Column (3) summarizes fi ve states that took early policy actions 
to avoid or reduce the volume of borrowing. All fi ve of these states 
had low prerecession reserves, with RRMs below 0.50. Three of the 
fi ve (New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Tennessee) instituted tem-
porary quarterly taxes to enhance revenue. These taxes were to sun-
set when the trust fund’s recovery was deemed adequate by program 
administrators.
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Prior to the Great Recession, 16 states plus the Virgin Islands 
had indexed taxable wage bases with increases tied automatically to 
changes in statewide average wages. Following the recession, three 
states adopted indexation. In two, the tax base started to increase 
automatically in 2013 (Colorado and Rhode Island). In the third, Ver-
mont, the base increased from $8,000 in 2009 to $16,000 in 2012, 
with indexed increases commencing in 2015.
During and after the recession, 11 states increased their tax bases 
by at least 50 percent (column [5]). The largest increases occurred in 
Delaware, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Vermont, where the tax 
base at least doubled between 2007 and 2015. Note that the states 
making these large increases had a prerecession average RRM that 
about matched the national average.
Six of the eight states that issued municipal bonds (column [6]) 
had prerecession RRMs below 0.50. Four of these states (Illinois, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas) issued municipal bonds with 
long maturities (fi nal maturities of 2020 or later). Each of the four 
used the proceeds from the bonds to repay Treasury loans that carried 
higher interest rates than the bonds. The issuances could be described 
as arbitrage (or debt-restructuring) transactions that delayed repay-
ment dates as well as secured lower interest rates. It is quite likely 
some of these bonds will still be outstanding when the U.S. economy 
enters the next recession.
If a state’s debt to the Treasury is outstanding on January 1 
of two consecutive years and not fully repaid by November 10 of 
the second year, it may be subject to Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act (FUTA) credit off sets payable in January of the following year. 
Roughly half the state UI programs were subject to FUTA credit off -
sets in at least one year between 2009 and 2015. From 2012 to 2015, 
these added federal taxes accounted for 10 percent or more of state 
UI tax revenue in nine states. These nine states had very low pre-
recession reserves, with seven of nine RRMs falling below 0.25 in 
2007 (column [7]). These states exhausted their trust funds early in 
the recession and became subject to FUTA credit off sets in 2012. 
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Several of the nine states experienced prolonged indebtedness to the 
Treasury, hence multiple years of reduced FUTA credit off sets. The 
mean and median RRMs for these states in 2007 are the lowest of any 
group in Table 4.1, both below 0.20. 
FUTA CREDIT REDUCTIONS
As just noted, one feature of the Great Recession was the wide-
spread and prolonged indebtedness of most state UI trust funds. From 
2009 to 2011, 35 state programs (36 including the Virgin Islands) bor-
rowed from the Treasury. Many states had debts for multiyear periods, 
and 11 programs were still making debt repayments in April 2016.3 
Because these debts were outstanding for multiyear periods, 
26 programs were subject to the automatic debt repayment through 
reductions in their FUTA tax credits. Typically 5.4 percent of the 
6.0 percent FUTA tax levied on the fi rst $7,000 of taxable payroll is 
waived in states with acceptable experience-rating systems. However, 
if Treasury loans are outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive 
years and not fully repaid by November 10 of the second year, the 5.4 
percent FUTA tax waiver usually starts to be reduced, with the reduc-
tion payable in January of the following year. The initial reduction 
is 0.3 percent of federal taxable payroll ($21), but the reduction then 
grows with each successive year of continued indebtedness.
From 2009 to 2015, 24 states and the Virgin Islands were sub-
ject to FUTA credit reductions. Eighteen states plus the Virgin Islands 
experienced credit reductions for three or more years during this 
period. The aggregate revenue from the credit reductions totaled 
$10.7 billion, with $10.4 billion paid from 2012 to 2015.4 Total state 
UI taxes (including FUTA credit reductions) paid during this period 
were $128.3 billion. Thus, over these four years, the credit reductions 
accounted for 8.3 percent of total state UI tax revenue.
The FUTA credit reductions were of varying importance in 
individual states. Table 4.2 focuses on the experiences of 18 states 
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from 2012 to 2015, the 13 largest states (in terms of taxable covered 
employment in 2013) and fi ve other states where FUTA credit reduc-
tions accounted for at least 5.0 percent of total UI tax revenue during 
the period. The 13 largest states were singled out for two reasons: 
1) they dominate in aggregate UI program performance, account-
ing for about two-thirds of tax revenue and benefi t payments; and 2) 
their debt repayment behavior diff ers from that of smaller states, as 
documented in Vroman (2016). Only 2 of the 13 largest states (Texas 
and Massachusetts) were not subject to FUTA credit reductions from 
2012 to 2015. Texas issued municipal bonds in late 2010, while Mas-
sachusetts incurred debts for just a few months during 2011. The 
other 11 states paid $8.0 billion in credit off sets, about 77 percent of 
the national total in that four-year period.
With widespread trust fund restoration now underway, 2017 and 
2018 may be the fi nal years when FUTA credit off sets will make a 
measurable contribution to state UI tax revenue. Estimates made at 
the Urban Institute indicate that the credit reductions will total $2.0 
billion in 2017 (California) and $2.4 billion in 2018 (again Califor-
nia). Although the payments could extend into 2019, it seems more 
likely that California’s trust fund balance on November 10, 2018, will 
be positive, obviating the need for a credit off set in 2019. If this is the 
Table 4.2  FUTA Credit Reductions as a Share of Total UI Tax Revenue, 
2012 to 2015
Share of total tax revenue
Number of 
state programs States
0.20 and above 2 IN, OH
0.15–0.199 1 KY
0.10–0.149 6 CA, CT, GA, MO, NY, NC
0.05–0.099 3 AR, FL, WI
0.00–0.049 4 IL, NJ, PA, VA
0 2 MA, TX
Total 18
SOURCE: Estimates of FUTA credit reduction shares made by the author. 
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case, FUTA credit off sets will have been active for nine consecutive 
years from 2010 to 2018, with total off sets exceeding $18.0 billion.
Although FUTA credit off sets have helped many states to repay 
their debts, their positive eff ect on tax revenue occurs only in years 
when a state’s net trust fund balance is negative. Once the net balance 
starts to consistently exceed zero, these added UI taxes automatically 
stop. Thus, only California, Connecticut, Ohio, and the Virgin Islands 
paid FUTA credit off sets in 2016. FUTA credit off sets, in other words, 
help states eliminate negative trust fund balances, but they do not 
continue to help in fund building after a positive balance has been 
achieved.
To summarize the responses of the state UI tax systems follow-
ing the Great Recession, four points should be emphasized. 1) The 
individual states responded in a wide variety of ways, and Table 4.1 
summarizes the responses. 2) About one-third of the states, mostly 
those with adequate prerecession reserves, allowed their experience-
rating systems to operate as specifi ed in their state statutes. These 
states had limited need for Treasury loans, and their trust funds have 
been restored to generally high levels. 3) Eleven states made large 
increases in their taxable wage bases, and each of them had a tax 
base in 2015 that was at least 50 percent higher than it had been in 
2007. 4) One-third of the states either issued municipal bonds (eight) 
or allowed FUTA credit reductions to account for at least 10 percent 
of their postrecession tax revenue responses (nine). Neither strategy 
promoted robust trust fund recoveries. The states that issued bonds 
deferred part of their debt repayment until much later time periods. 
The FUTA credit off sets stopped contributing to trust fund recoveries 
after net trust fund balances became positive. Both strategies retarded 
the restoration of adequate trust fund balances in the states that fol-
lowed these policies. 
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POSTRECESSION RESPONSES OF STATE UI BENEFITS
Improvements in fund solvency also can be achieved through 
benefi t reductions. Over the long run, of course, benefi t reductions 
also weaken the performance of UI as an automatic stabilizer of the 
macro economy. Documenting the recent changes in program benefi ts 
can provide a basis for estimating how much UI’s stabilizing perfor-
mance has been weakened.
Among various benefi t adjustments made by states following the 
Great Recession, three were particularly prevalent, one passive and 
two active. The passive adjustment was not increasing the maximum 
weekly benefi t for several consecutive years. One active adjustment 
was reducing the maximum number of potential weeks of regular UI 
benefi ts starting in 2011. The other active adjustment was increasing 
the amount of administrative activity to monitor payment accuracy, 
which, coupled with ongoing problems of program administration, 
could adversely aff ect receipt of benefi ts. 
Changes in the Replacement Rate 
About half the state programs operate with an indexed maxi-
mum weekly benefi t that increases automatically as statewide wages 
increase. Other states raise the maximum periodically by state legisla-
tion. Several of these latter states have not increased their maximum 
benefi ts for many years. 
To document the prevalence of this nonadjustment pattern, each 
state’s maximum weekly benefi t amount (WBA) was noted for Janu-
ary 2016 and for previous Januarys, and the number of consecutive 
Januarys with the same maximum was counted. Of the 24 states with-
out an indexed maximum, the number of consecutive years with an 
unchanged maximum ranged from 4 to 19. In all but one state, the 
maximum WBA was unchanged for at least 5 consecutive years, and 
in fi ve states, it ranged from 13 to 19 (Florida). The mean for the 24 
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states was 9.75 years, and the average 2016 maximum WBA had been 
unchanged for a decade. 
From 2004 to 2015, the annual earnings in taxable covered 
employment nationwide increased from $39,141 to $52,066 or by 
33.0 percent. For a state with average wage infl ation and whose maxi-
mum was stable during 12 consecutive years, the maximum benefi t 
would be 33.0 percent lower relative to annual wages at the end of 
the period. This decrease would exert a downward pressure on the 
replacement rate (the ratio of weekly benefi ts to the average weekly 
wage).5 Because so many states have operated with unchanged maxi-
mum benefi ts for several consecutive years, many replacement rates 
have also been adversely aff ected. From 2005 to 2015, the replace-
ment rate decreased in 35 of 51 programs. Although changes in mon-
etary eligibility requirements and some actual reductions in weekly 
maxima also contributed to these decreases,6 the average replace-
ment rate decreased by 0.03 or more in 10 states from 2010 to 2015. 
Seven of the 10 experienced reductions of between 0.03 and 0.049,7 
while even larger reductions occurred in Indiana (–0.086), Rhode 
Island (–0.091), and North Carolina (–0.116). Thus, the generosity 
of weekly benefi ts decreased in the majority of states from 2010 to 
2015, with particularly large reductions occurring in Indiana, North 
Carolina, and Rhode Island.
Figure 4.1 provides a visual summary of the national replacement 
rate for the 31 years from 1985 to 2015. The fi gure identifi es three 
multiyear periods when the national replacement rate was noticeably 
lower than in adjacent years: 1997 to 2000, 2005 to 2008, and 2011 
to 2015. The 2011 to 2015 period has the lowest average replacement 
rate of all fi ve-year periods covered by Figure 4.1. A large part of 
the explanation for these low replacement rates has been the failure 
of many nonindexed states to increase their maximum WBAs in the 
years following the Great Recession. Compared to the earliest fi ve 
years in Figure 4.1, the national average replacement rate from 2011 
to 2015 was 2.6 percentage points lower (32.8 versus 35.4). 
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Potential Benefi t Duration
An important recent change in several state UI programs has 
been to reduce maximum potential benefi t duration. Since 2011, eight 
states have reduced maximum potential duration to fewer than 26 
weeks, and at least one additional state (Idaho) planned to implement 
a reduction in 2017. The reductions follow four decades when all state 
programs off ered at least 26 weeks of potential benefi ts in every year.8 
During the fi rst half of 2016, maximum duration was between 12 and 
20 weeks in these eight states, and three of them have reduced poten-
tial benefi t duration twice since 2011.9 In the rest of this section, I 
examine the eff ects of the benefi t reductions on benefi t recipiency as 
well as the overall benefi t recipiency rates in individual states. 
Figure 4.2 shows maximum potential benefi t duration in the eight 
states that paid fewer than 26 weeks of potential benefi ts during the 
fi rst half of 2016. The maximum durations ranged from 12 weeks 
(Florida) to 20 weeks (Arkansas, Michigan, Missouri, and South 
Carolina). Shorter potential benefi t durations would be expected to 
Figure 4.1  UI Replacement Rate, 1985 to 2015
SOURCE: Replacement rates from column (33) of ET Handbook 394, Unemployment 
Insurance Financial Data.
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reduce the recipiency rate (the ratio of weekly benefi ciaries to weekly 
unemployment) through shorter periods of potential eligibility and 
more rapid exhaustion of benefi ts. Another potential determinant of 
the recipiency rate is the unemployment rate, because average unem-
ployment duration increases during recessions when unemployment 
increases. 
The approach followed here is to fi t recipiency rate regressions 
for a period prior to the reduction in potential benefi t duration, project 
the recipiency rate for later periods, and examine projection errors 
with particular attention to periods of shorter potential duration. A 
recipiency rate regression using annual data was fi tted for each state 
for the years 1967 to 2007. Each regression used two explanatory 
variables: the state’s current total unemployment rate (TUR) and 
TUR lagged one year. Table 4A.1 presents the regressions.
Table 4A.1 shows that state-level recipiency rates display con-
siderable short-run noise. Although the table has regressions for 51 
UI programs, the eight highlighted in bold in the table are shown in 
Figure 4.2  Maximum Potential Benefi t Duration, Eight States, 2000 
to 2016 (weeks)
SOURCE: Data from “Signifi cant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance 
Laws,” various issues through July 2016. The maxima can change in January and 
June of each year. Figure 4.1 shows annual duration with weights of 0.55 and 0.45 
for the two periods. 
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Figure 4.2. Seven of the eight have adjusted R2s of less than 0.50, and 
all eight standard errors of the estimates are between 0.034 and 0.049. 
The coeffi  cient patterns for the TUR variables are consistent. All cur-
rent TURs have positive coeffi  cients, and six have t ratios of at least 
2.0, a common threshold for statistical signifi cance. All eight lagged 
TURs have negative coeffi  cients, and all eight have t ratios of least 
2.0. The recipiency rate increases in years with high unemployment 
rates but then decreases when the lagged unemployment rate is high. 
The regressions in Table 4A.1 were used to project recipiency 
rates through 2015. Two sets of average projection errors are shown 
in Table 4.3: 2008 to 2011 and 2012 to 2015. Note that all projections 
are for years beyond the regressions’ estimation periods, which ended 
in 2007, and that nearly all of the reductions in average potential dura-
tion below 26 weeks occurred during 2012 to 2015, the latter of the 
two four-year projection periods.10
The reduced maximum durations would be expected to cause 
larger projection errors during 2012 to 2015 as compared to 2008 to 
2011, and the average projection errors for the two periods generally 
support this expectation. Six of eight averages are negative (i.e., they 
are overprojections) in the fi rst period, but all eight are negative in the 
second. Six of eight equations were overprojecting by larger amounts 
during the fi rst period relative to the second one; that is, the changes 
in these four-year averages are negative in all states but Georgia and 
Kansas. When the changes are examined for individual states (bot-
tom row of Table 4.3), note that fi ve changes are more negative than 
–0.045 (Florida, North Carolina, Michigan, South Carolina, and 
Arkansas). 
Period FL GA NC KS MO MI SC AR
2008–11 0.025 –0.125 –0.054 –0.034 –0.034 –0.021 –0.066 0.034
2012–15 –0.051 –0.108 –0.112 –0.033 –0.070 –0.083 –0.113 –0.038
Change –0.076 0.017 –0.058 0.001 –0.036 –0.062 –0.047 –0.072
Table 4.3  Average Projection Errors by State, 2008 to 2015
SOURCE: Average projection errors based on the regressions displayed in Table 4A.1.
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The projection analysis indicates that recipiency declined in the 
period of 2012 to 2015, the period when potential duration decreased 
in these states. The explanation for the decline may include factors 
besides changes in potential duration. For example, changes in UI 
program administration could be linked to the decreases. On the other 
hand, the 2012 to 2015 period was characterized by much lower 
unemployment than that of 2008 to 2011. Thus, the analysis yielded 
results consistent with the expectation that a shorter potential duration 
reduced recipiency rates in these eight states. 
UI Program Administration
State UI administrative activities are fi nanced mainly by grants 
allocated by the Offi  ce of UI, which is part of the Employment and 
Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor. These 
administrative grants are based mainly on workloads related to UI 
claims. About one-fi fth of the states supplement their federal grants 
with state resources.
Over the past 20 years, program administration has evolved away 
from face-to-face contact between claimants and administrators to 
electronic contacts, either by telephone or over the Internet. Nearly all 
decisions aff ecting initial eligibility and continuing eligibility are now 
made through electronic media, with Internet claims accounting for 
more than half of all administrative decisions related to UI eligibility.
Several ongoing challenges have been faced in the transition to 
electronic program administration, particularly in providing timely 
and accurate eligibility decisions. The computer IT systems in many 
states use old programming languages, and updating them has proven 
challenging. Also, since administrative allocations are closely linked 
to claims volume, fi nancial support has decreased as the economic 
recovery has progressed.
A recent analysis by the U.S. Government Accountability Offi  ce 
(GAO) documented these challenges with results from a recent sur-
vey of all states and intensive interviews with claimant focus groups 
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in three states (GAO 2016). Frequent problems with telephone claims 
identifi ed by the GAO were long wait times, frequent dropped calls, 
diffi  culty in reaching program representatives, and frequent aban-
doned calls. Inadequate staffi  ng was identifi ed as a major cause of 
these problems. Inadequate administrative funding and outmoded 
IT systems also were frequently identifi ed as underlying causes of 
administrative problems.
In recent years, the national offi  ce of the UI program has placed 
greater emphasis on payment accuracy. Increased emphasis is being 
paid to the states’ Benefi t Accuracy Measurement reports, which sum-
marize payment accuracy and identify the source(s) of payment errors 
by the party (claimant, employer, or agency) and individual adminis-
trative process, and also include estimates of claimant fraud. While no 
research has thoroughly documented the eff ects of the administrative 
problems and increased emphasis on payment accuracy, these factors 
could be contributing to a decrease in UI recipiency. These adminis-
trative issues are present in all states to some degree, and they may 
have macro consequences in reducing the recipiency rate. 
RECIPIENCY RATES IN INDIVIDUAL STATES
To develop a more nuanced understanding of the recent decline 
in UI recipiency, a state-level regression analysis was conducted. For 
each state, a background time series regression was fi tted using annual 
data. The estimation period was from 1967 to 2007, the 41 years prior 
to the onset of the Great Recession. For each state, the recipiency rate 
was regressed on TUR and TUR lagged one year. The recipiency rate 
measure was the ratio of weekly regular UI benefi ciaries to weekly 
total unemployment (the WKTU ratio), the latter measured by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
It is well known that the recipiency rate increases at the start of 
a recession when unemployment increases but then declines in later 
periods because of UI benefi t exhaustion and other factors. Hence, 
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the regressions included the current and lagged TURs as explanatory 
variables. In the highly varied labor markets of individual states, local 
factors besides unemployment undoubtedly also infl uence the recipi-
ency rate, but this analysis used only the two unemployment rate vari-
ables as arguments to explain variation in state-level WKTU ratios.
After fi tting the regressions, the equations were then used to pro-
ject the recipiency rate for the eight years following the end of the 
estimation period, that is, from 2008 to 2015. The patterns in the pro-
jection errors were then examined. Table 4A.1 displays the underlying 
regressions for the period from 1967 to 2007. There are 51 equations, 
one for each state plus the District of Columbia. Generally, TUR had 
the expected positive coeffi  cient while lagged TUR generally had a 
negative coeffi  cient. The regressions had relatively low explanatory 
power, with a simple average of only 0.245 for the adjusted R2s.
Table 4.4 displays the average equation residuals for the fi nal 
eight years of the estimation period (2000 to 2007) and for the eight 
years after the estimation period (2008 to 2015). Because the underly-
ing regressions had generally low explanatory power, the errors were 
averaged for four-year periods at the end of the estimation period 
and in the postestimation years: 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2007, 2008 
to 2011, and 2012 to 2015. The average residuals are shown for three 
groups: the whole group (51), the 8 that have shortened maximum 
potential durations of less than 26 weeks, and the 43 that have not 
shortened the maximum potential duration. 
For the groups of 8 and 43 states, the averages during 2000 to 
2003 and 2004 to 2007 are quite similar, positive, and greater than 
0.030 for 2000 to 2003, and negative but only –0.0009 and –0.0046, 
respectively, for 2004 to 2007. During 2008 to 2011, the average 
residuals are noticeably more negative (i.e., larger overpredictions) 
for the 8 states compared to the other 43 (–0.0339 versus –0.0101). 
The average residuals for both groups of states become even more 
negative during 2012 to 2015, but the average overpredictions are 
much larger for the eight reduced-duration states (–0.0752 versus 
–0.0425). Measured relative to their respective averages during 1967 
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to 2007, the overprediction averages are 27.3 percent for the reduced 
duration states and 13.2 percent for the other 43 states. Not surpris-
ingly, recipiency decreased by a larger percentage in the states that 
have reduced maximum potential durations.
Table 4.4 also shows the number of state-level four-year average 
residuals that were negative during each of the four periods. Overall, 
33 of 51 were negative during 2008 to 2011, and 43 were negative 
during 2012 to 2015. For the most recent four years, the averages 
were negative for all 8 reduced-duration states and for 35 of the 43 
remaining states. Underlying the negative averages in Table 4.4’s 
top panel were widespread negative averages for all 8 of the reduced 
maximum duration states and 35 of the 43 other states in the 2012 to 
2015 period.
An important fi nding of this analysis is that on average recipiency 
in the most recent years has decreased in most state UI programs. 
Actual recipiency rates during 2012 to 2015 fell below projected 
recipiency rates in 43 of 51 programs. The decrease in recipiency 
apparent in national data (shown below) has occurred in most of 
2000–03 2004–07 2008–11 2012–15
Average residuals by 
four-year period
All states (51) 0.0320 –0.0040 –0.0138 –0.0476
Reduced duration 
states (8)
0.0327 –0.0009 –0.0339 –0.0752
Others (43) 0.0319 –0.0046 –0.0101 –0.0425
Number of negative 
average residuals
All states (51) 9 29 33 43
Reduced duration 
states (8)
2 4 6 8
Others (43) 7 25 27 35
Table 4.4  Average Residuals for Selected Four-Year Periods
SOURCE: Residuals based on the regressions in Table 4A.1. The averages weight each 
state equally.
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the individual state programs that make up the system of regular UI 
programs.
What underlies the decrease in UI recipiency? Since recipiency 
rates in the eight reduced-duration states decreased more than in the 
other states, one part of the explanation is the reductions in maximum 
potential duration. However, there must be other factors, as evidenced 
by the widespread negative error averages in the 43 other states dur-
ing 2012 to 2015. The exact cause (or causes) for the decrease in 
recipiency cannot be determined from the regression analysis pre-
sented here. What the regressions in Table 4A.1 do show, however, 
is that the recent decrease in the recipiency rate has been widespread 
throughout the system of state UI programs. 
THE UI PROGRAM NATIONWIDE
The fi nal section of this chapter examines the regular state UI 
program at the national level, with attention to benefi t recipiency and 
the aggregate trust fund. The analysis concentrates on the years from 
2006 to 2015, that is, from just before the Great Recession to fi ve 
years after it ended.
Figure 4.3 displays the ratio of weekly regular UI claims to unem-
ployment (IUTU ratio), as measured in the monthly labor force survey 
from 2006 to 2015. A salient feature of the fi gure is the contrast in the 
recipiency rate prior to the Great Recession and the recipiency rate 
since 2012. The average monthly IUTU ratio between January 2006 
and December 2007 was 0.356, whereas between January 2012 and 
December 2015, the average IUTU ratio was 0.268, or 24.7 percent 
below the average for 2006 and 2007. Note also that the IUTU ratio 
does not display a pronounced upward trend during 2012 to 2015 (at 
most an increase of 0.030) as the economy was moving closer to full 
employment. The UI recipiency rate is now substantially lower than 
it was prior to the Great Recession. This decline will have adverse 
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Figure 4.3  IUTU Ratio, 2006 to 2015
SOURCE: IUTU ratios calculated at the Urban Institute.
eff ects on the performance of state UI as an automatic stabilizer when 
the U.S. economy experiences the next recession.
Figure 4.4 traces the overall net trust fund balance of the state UI 
programs from the end of 2005 to mid-2016. The quarterly patterns 
clearly show how reserves are lowest at the end of the fi rst calen-
dar quarter and then recover sharply during April and May when fi rst 
quarter tax accruals are received. 
Figure 4.4 also shows the continuing presence of outstanding 
municipal bond principal (i.e., the vertical distance between total 
net reserves and the net reserves at the Treasury). At the end of June 
2016, the states owed approximately $4.5 billion in the municipal 
bond market as well as approximately $3.5 billion to the U.S. Trea-
sury. These debts were owed by UI programs in eight states plus the 
Virgin Islands, despite the fact that seven full years have elapsed since 
the end of the Great Recession.
Finally, note that net reserves at the end of June 2016 totaled 
$36.0 billion, which was nearly back to the prerecession level of 
approximately $40.0 billion. However, since the covered payroll 
Chapter 4.indd   120 9/5/2018   9:06:46 AM
State UI Financing Response to the Great Recession   121
in 2016 was more than 20 percent greater than it was in 2007, net 
reserves should be roughly $48 billion to just match the reserve ratio 
at the end of 2007. Thus, while substantial trust fund building has 
occurred since the trough of the recession, the net balance would have 
to have been 24 percent higher than it was just to be equivalent to the 
balance at the end of 2007.
Although the aggregate net trust fund was about three-fourths 
of the way to matching the balance at the end of 2007, the situation 
in individual state programs remains highly varied. In 19 states, the 
reserve ratio (net reserves as a percent of total payroll) at the end of 
June 2016 matched or exceeded its level at the end of 2007. However, 
net reserves were still negative in 2 states (California and Pennsylva-
nia) plus the Virgin Islands, and another 11 had reserve ratios of less 
than half of their 2007 reserve ratios. In short, reserves in individual 
states were highly varied at the end of June 2016, and many states still 
had very low or negative net reserves.
Even though substantial progress has been made in trust fund res-
toration, more fund building is needed to return to the reserve posi-
Figure 4.4  Net UI Trust Fund Reserves, 2005Q4 to 2016Q2
SOURCE: Net reserve estimates made at the Urban Institute.
Total net reserves ($ billions)
Net reserves at Treasury ($ billions)
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tion held just prior to the Great Recession. Given the inadequacy of 
reserves at the start of the Great Recession and the subsequent amount 
of state borrowing, prudent fund management requires continued trust 
fund building in the immediate future. 
Compared to the years prior to the Great Recession, the benefi t 
side of the state system of UI programs is now measurably smaller. 
The orders of magnitude presented here suggest that the recipiency 
rate is approximately 25 percent lower (0.268 compared to 0.356) 
than prior to the Great Recession, while the benefi t replacement rate 
is about 7 percent lower (0.328 compared to 0.354). Combined, these 
two changes suggest the benefi t side of the UI system is now only 
about 70 percent as generous as it was prior to the Great Recession. 
While benefi t reductions have contributed to the recovery of state UI 
trust funds, they have also signifi cantly reduced the generosity of the 
system of state UI programs. These reductions in benefi t generosity 
will permanently weaken the performance of UI as an automatic sta-
bilizer in future recessions.
Notes
Financial support was provided by the Urban Institute. The opinions expressed 
in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views 
of the Urban Institute or its sponsors. Thoughtful comments were provided 
by Richard Hobbie.
 1. The RRM is the ratio of two ratios. The numerator is the reserve ratio, 
which is the end-of-year trust fund balance (net of UI debts) as a per-
centage of total covered payroll. The denominator is the highest past 
annual payout rate (benefi ts as a percentage of payroll for the high-
payout period).  
 2. There are 53 UI programs, but the table does not include the programs 
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 
 3. The fi ve programs with debts to the Treasury in mid-April 2016 were 
California, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, and the Virgin Islands. The six 
states with debts in the municipal bond market were Colorado, Illinois, 
Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Total indebtedness at the 
end of March 2016 was approximately $12.0 billion.  
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 4. Annual data on FUTA credit reductions from 2010 to 2015 were pro-
vided by the actuarial staff  of the Unemployment Insurance Service of 
the U.S. Department of Labor. Estimates for 2016 and later years were 
made by the author. 
 5. The change in the replacement rate would depend upon several factors, 
but the unchanged maximum and the share of benefi ciaries at the maxi-
mum WBA are very important.  
 6. Most notably, North Carolina reduced its weekly maximum from $535 
to $350 in July 2013. 
 7. The seven states are California, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, New 
York, Tennessee, and Washington. All but Washington experienced pro-
longed periods with a constant maximum WBA. 
 8. The last state to off er fewer than 26 weeks prior to 2011 was South 
Carolina, with a 22-week maximum in 1969. 
 9. Missouri enacted a 20-week maximum in 2011 and a sliding scale of 
between 13 and 20 weeks in January 2016. The sliding scale was over-
turned by a court ruling in mid-2016, restoring the 20-week maximum. 
Arkansas enacted a 25-week maximum in 2011 and a 20-week maxi-
mum in October 2015. Florida enacted a 23-week maximum in 2012 
and a sliding scale of between 12 and 20 weeks in 2014. 
 10. The only reductions before 2012 were to 25 weeks in Arkansas and 20 
weeks in Missouri, both in July 2011. 
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Appendix 4A 
State-Level Recipiency Rate Regressions 
Table 4A.1 displays state-level regressions that explain regular UI recip-
iency rates for the period from 1967 to 2007. The dependent variable is mea-
sured as the ratio of average number of weekly regular UI benefi ciaries to 
average weekly unemployment (the WKTU ratio). The data period includes 
the years for which the BLS has published unemployment rate estimates for 
individual states.1 
Each regression has two explanatory variables: TUR and TUR lagged 
one year. The two TUR variables refl ect the common observation that the 
recipiency rate increases in the early stages of a recession as overall unem-
ployment is increasing but then decreases in later periods due to increased 
benefi t exhaustions by recipients. The expectation for these two variables is 
that TUR will have a positive regression coeffi  cient and that lagged TUR will 
have a negative coeffi  cient. 
Table 4A.1 shows these expectations are generally met. For TUR, 48 
of the 51 slope coeffi  cients are positive, and 29 have t ratios of at least 2.0 
(a common indicator of signifi cance). For lagged TUR, 48 coeffi  cients are 
negative, and 38 have t ratios of 2.0 or larger. Although the slope coeffi  cients 
generally have the expected signs, the regression fi ts are modest. The average 
adjusted R2 is only 0.245, and only 16 exceed 0.30.
Two factors undoubtedly account for the low R2 values. First, there is 
considerable noise in state-level estimates of annual unemployment (the 
denominator of the recipiency rate variables) due to the limited size of Cur-
rent Population Survey samples in individual states. Second, several other 
factors infl uence unemployment and UI recipiency at the state level, and 
those factors are not controlled for in the regressions.
After the regressions were fi tted, the regression errors were noted for 
each year. Each equation then was used to project the recipiency rate in the 
postsample years 2008 to 2015. The residuals for the years 2000 to 2007 
and the projection errors for the years 2008 to 2015 were then averaged by 
four-year period (see Table 4.4 in the text). The underlying projections for the 
individual years were saved and are available, but the text presents four-year 
average residuals for simplicity. 
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Table 4A.1 State-Level Regressions of the Regular UI Recipiency Rate, 1967 to 2007
State Constant t TUR T TURlag T Adj. R2 Std. Err. D.W. Mean
Alabama 0.287 13.6 −0.496 1.7 0.002 0.2 0.025 0.046 0.98 0.255
Alaska 0.684 5.6 1.133 0.5 −2.541 1.2 −0.008 0.143 0.42 0.564
Arizona 0.208 9.0 1.915 4.1 −1.954 4.1 0.312 0.036 1.45 0.205
Arkansas 0.371 10.6 1.547 1.8 −2.816 3.2 0.210 0.049 0.49 0.289
California 0.435 25.8 1.092 3.3 −2.085 6.2 0.507 0.021 1.05 0.365
Colorado 0.104 5.1 1.679 2.8 −0.105 0.2 0.288 0.032 0.67 0.182
Connecticut 0.574 12.4 2.233 1.7 −4.311 3.4 0.230 0.092 0.52 0.468
Delaware 0.488 14.3 0.534 0.5 −2.391 2.1 0.180 0.069 0.86 0.390
Dist. of Col. 0.352 8.1 1.658 1.6 −1.405 1.3 0.010 0.069 1.38 0.370
Florida 0.183 8.7 1.008 1.9 −1.140 2.1 0.063 0.036 0.33 0.176
Georgia 0.138 4.6 4.230 5.1 −2.621 3.2 0.386 0.044 1.72 0.224
Hawaii 0.377 17.7 3.299 3.8 −3.553 4.1 0.271 0.043 1.42 0.364
Idaho 0.349 9.6 0.480 0.5 −0.960 0.9 −0.024 0.050 0.35 0.320
Illinois 0.380 14.5 2.314 3.0 −3.021 4.0 0.267 0.051 0.63 0.338
Indiana 0.274 12.9 2.201 3.4 −2.828 4.5 0.317 0.047 0.67 0.240
Iowa 0.383 18.7 2.554 2.3 −3.787 3.6 0.281 0.048 0.67 0.334
Kansas 0.269 9.1 5.758 5.5 −4.878 4.9 0.420 0.041 0.83 0.309
Kentucky 0.328 11.7 1.862 2.4 −2.644 3.4 0.212 0.050 0.88 0.280
Louisiana 0.210 5.2 2.382 2.3 −1.900 1.8 0.081 0.065 1.02 0.245
Maine 0.394 12.3 2.302 2.4 −2.722 2.9 0.143 0.056 0.79 0.371
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Maryland 0.304 14.3 2.993 4.1 −3.518 4.8 0.343 0.033 1.00 0.278
Massachusetts 0.676 28.3 0.764 1.1 −4.567 6.8 0.716 0.049 0.64 0.470
Michigan 0.428 27.8 1.992 5.8 −3.270 9.8 0.738 0.034 1.30 0.335
Minnesota 0.362 14.5 1.880 2.1 −2.306 2.6 0.111 0.041 1.14 0.344
Mississippi 0.199 10.5 2.473 4.5 −2.296 4.2 0.314 0.035 1.04 0.212
Missouri 0.417 16.3 2.195 2.7 −4.208 5.3 0.479 0.044 1.47 0.311
Montana 0.354 10.2 −1.305 1.2 0.292 0.3 0.045 0.045 0.55 0.294
Nebraska 0.241 11.5 1.525 1.7 −0.267 0.3 0.078 0.035 1.15 0.284
Nevada 0.410 10.7 1.729 1.8 −2.334 2.4 0.091 0.058 0.58 0.373
New Hampshire 0.257 6.3 4.984 3.2 −5.136 3.4 0.202 0.089 0.92 0.254
New Jersey 0.640 18.6 0.641 0.7 −3.397 3.6 0.405 0.062 0.44 0.477
New Mexico 0.275 10.7 1.076 1.7 −2.010 3.0 0.188 0.033 1.06 0.213
New York 0.534 13.8 1.432 1.4 −3.633 3.6 0.321 0.061 0.43 0.396
North Carolina 0.222 8.4 3.278 5.2 −2.326 3.7 0.386 0.044 0.93 0.271
North Dakota 0.213 4.4 1.732 0.9 0.586 0.3 0.050 0.060 0.35 0.308
Ohio 0.244 13.2 2.778 5.9 −2.580 5.6 0.463 0.037 0.92 0.258
Oklahoma 0.267 8.8 1.289 1.5 −2.333 2.8 0.138 0.049 0.92 0.215
Oregon 0.459 15.0 1.058 1.5 −2.369 3.5 0.266 0.046 0.77 0.369
Pennsylvania 0.480 16.5 2.645 3.0 −3.306 3.8 0.245 0.053 0.34 0.441
Rhode Island 0.665 16.2 −0.902 1.0 −1.755 1.9 0.261 0.081 0.48 0.510
South Carolina 0.213 6.6 3.309 4.7 −2.745 3.9 0.338 0.048 1.51 0.247
South Dakota 0.191 6.1 2.342 1.5 −2.874 1.9 0.036 0.043 0.40 0.173
(continued)
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Table 4A.1  (continued)
State Constant t TUR T TURlag T Adj. R2 Std. Err. D.W. Mean
Tennessee 0.367 15.9 2.169 3.3 −3.414 5.3 0.427 0.045 1.20 0.296
Texas 0.105 5.0 2.287 3.6 −1.046 1.6 0.295 0.031 0.64 0.175
Utah 0.164 5.4 2.367 2.7 −0.719 0.8 0.204 0.047 0.47 0.247
Vermont 0.484 22.6 1.320 1.8 −2.226 3.0 0.184 0.040 0.86 0.441
Virginia 0.152 5.1 2.875 2.6 −2.275 2.0 0.103 0.048 0.53 0.178
Washington 0.440 11.7 1.768 2.2 −2.655 3.2 0.186 0.058 0.57 0.377
West Virginia 0.336 12.5 1.495 2.3 −2.240 3.4 0.229 0.055 0.35 0.273
Wisconsin 0.482 14.2 1.509 1.4 −3.035 2.8 0.179 0.067 0.42 0.405
Wyoming 0.180 5.2 4.940 4.1 −3.445 2.8 0.285 0.060 0.53 0.250
U.S. average 0.344 12.1 1.967 2.6 −2.452 3.1 0.245 0.051 0.80 0.313
The regressions generally have low Durbin Watson statistics, indicating a high degree of positive serial correlation in the residuals. The fi nal 
column shows the mean WKTU ratio for each state. The average recipiency rate was 0.313, but it varied widely across the 51 programs. Eight 
means exceed 0.400, and fi ve fall below 0.200.
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Appendix Note
 1. State level estimates of unemployment rates are incomplete from 1967 
to 1975, particularly for 1967 to 1969. Estimates have more complete 
geographic coverage starting in 1970. For years prior to 1976, there are 
divisional estimates of unemployment, and these have been used to con-
struct state-level estimates for states where there are no BLS estimates. 
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